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Foreword

In a letter to the New York Times published April 9th,
1963, Bertrand Russell cut through to the essence of the situation in South Vietnam and properly characterized a war concerning which many Americans must at least feel misgivings.
The four paragraphs penned by this distinguished citizen
of the world will serve as an introduction to this pamphlet, the
purpose of which is to contribute to a just and moral answer to
Lord Russell's climactic question.
To the Editor of the New York Times:
The United States Government is conducting a war of annihilation in Vietnam. The sole purpose of the war is to retain a
brutal and feudal regime in the South and to exterminate all
those who resist the dictatorship of the South. A further purpose
is an invasion of the North, which is in Communist hands.
The real concern which brings the United States to pursue the
brutal policy abandoned by France in Indo-China is the protection
of economic interests and the prevention of far-reaching social
reforms in that part of the world.
I raise my voice, however, not only because I am in profound
disagreement with American objections to social change in IndoChina, but because the war which is being conducted is an atrocity.
Napalm jelly gasoline is being used against whole villages, without
warning. Chemical warfare is employed for the purpose of destroying crops and livestock and to starve the population.
The American Government has suppressed the truth about the
conduct of this war, the fact that it violates the Geneva agreements
concerning Indo-China, that it involves large numbers of American
troops, and that it is being conducted in a manner reminiscent of
warfare as practiced by the Germans in Eastern Europe and the
Japanese in Southeast Asia. How long will Americans lend themselves to this sort of barbarism?
Bertrand Russell
Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales, March 28, 1963

Reading the New York Times editorial attack on Lord
Russell's letter, published on the same day, I was reminded of

a memorable, and quite different, Times editorial of long ago-a May 10, 1940, comment on a Nazi bombing raid in Norway:
[Three planes] whipped down to the valley, whirled around
and came back again .... They knew what they were doing. They
knew they were destroying private houses in a helpless village ...
and people in these houses if they were not quick enough.
The story of air warfare of this sort has been told and retold .
. . . It is not an accidental "atrocity." ... It is an attested, studied,
boasted method of attack. These are the gangsters of the air.
Maybe they gain a temporary military advantage. They gain it by
building a world-wide horror and contempt which some day, be it
late or soon, will plow them under.
Hugh Deane
Mount Kisco, New York, May 20, 1963

THE WAR IN VIETNAM
By HUGH DEANE

Separated by a stretch of continent and an eventful quartercentury, the war in Vietham and the partisan-political war
begun in north China by the Eighth Route Army in the winter
of 1938 have essential similarities. To put down a peasant
revolution that has grown expert in use of its assets of people
and area-that is the problem now facing the governments of
Ngo Dinh Diem and the United States, as it was of the Japanese,
and the ways of going about it are basically limited.
The ancestor of the agrovilles and strategic hamlets of South
Vietnam was the system developed by the Japanese to protect
railways and other key points in north China, a system which
included what the Japanese dubbed "railway loving villages."
Walls and trenches to keep guerrillas out and the inhabitants in,
strict police surveillance of the population in the encompassed
areas, its division into groups and the holding of the group
responsible for the action of each member-these were important
elements in the Japanese defensive system, as in that developed
by the British in Malaya and now used in Vietnam.
American food and medical supplies are distributed to
some of the people as they are moved out of their houses and
put to work building the strategic hamlets, and a new deal is
promised them. "Rice roots democracy," Life calls the program,
without mentioning a high-level directive, perhaps written by
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, which according to a New York Times
account (June 24, 1962) instructs security forces on how to
Hugh Deane, a writer and editor, was an exchange student at Lingnan
University, Canton, in 1936-1937, and subsequently was a reporter in
China, J apan, and elsewhere in Asia for many years.
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handle Communists ("at one's convenience") and suspects (to
be arrested), on registration and identity card procedures, and
on how to hold elections so that the "people will elect those
whom we choose."l*
In north China too the Japanese made promises and employed the propaganda of -the small deed. They occasionally
sent "cheap goods trains" which stopped at the most loving
villages and sold Japanese merchandise at attractive prices.
Medical orderlies now and again came to give injections and
dispense pills and salves.
The offensive strategy adopted by the Japanese was that
of the fast encirclement and the hard strike. The regular infantry
proved cumbersome early in the w,a r, and the Japanese organized
fast-moving, tough, lightly armed units transported by truck
and then sent slicing through the countryside. These operations
were called "clean up drives" or "bandit mopping up campaigns" by the Japanese, "burn and kill drives" by the peasants.
In Vietnam helicopters have been substituted for trucks, and
such weapons as rockets and napalm have been added to the
arsenal used by the Imperial Army.
A succession of point-counterpoints are built into partisanpolitical wars. New weapons followed by defenses against them,
changed tactics in response to changes, the political consequences
of military practices and vice versa-these are ,some of the elements in the interplay of events. The early years of the China
war saw both the Eighth Route Army and the Japanese constantly changing and refining their tactics in response to changes
by the other, each suffering setbacks. Such give-and-take is
characteristic of this stage of 'the Vietnam war.
The Japanese investment in the conquest of China included
a sophisticated intelligence effort (some younger officers made
a cult of their studies of the Kiangsi campaigns between the
Kuomintang and the Chinese Red Army), and during the first
years Japan tried a broad approach to the problem of political
control. It forgave some land taxes, and introduced tax, fiscal,
and administrative reforms in the Chinese regime it set up.
A political party, the Hsi Min Hui, was organized and sought
to inculcate in the people an ideology compounded of faith in

*

Notes will be found at the end.
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the New Order, militant anti-Communism, disgust with the
Kuomintang, religious revival (a "Buddhist renaissance" was
fostered), appeal to Confucian relationships, and doctrines that
stressed personal morality and the things of the spirit. The
Hsi Min Hui also went in for what in South Vietnam is called
"civic action." This is a contemporary account:
The H si Min H ui arranges the mass meetings
organizes
the meetings for worshipping Confucius, for respecting ancestors .
. . . It runs a whole experimental hsien, organizes cooperatives,
sees to relief in distressed areas, distributes loans and seeds to
farmers. . . . It even imports pigs for breeding experiments. It
sends out traveling libraries, and offers prizes for student essays.
I t delights in model villages. 2

Some dedicated young Japanese and Chinese worked for
the Hsi Min Hui, but for the most part all this was on a token
scale, some of it Just for the reporters and cameras. It failed
to conceal the fact that the Japanese were invading foreigners,
hand-in-glove with the landlords. As the struggle went on,
Japanese tactics narrowed to one: force, weapons, terror. White
and jacoby's Thunder Out of China thus sums up the events
that were part of the indictment at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial:
As each succeeding Japanese atrocity failed, it called forth a
new doctrine of savagery. The baffled Japanese in the course of
six years arrived at total political bankruptcy in northern China;
their final slogan in 1944 was simply: "Kill all, burn all, loot all."
From one end of northern China to .another the blackened shells of
villages gave testimony to the wrath of the enemy, while in a
hundred thousand homes peasants nursed the bitterness of
revenge ...3

A point counterpoint of savage war in which the answer
to a deep-rooted revolution is-another weapon; this, too, is
happening in Vietnam.

The events that led directly to the war in South Vietnam
began in 1954, and the decision primarily responsible for them
was made in Washington.
Nineteen fifty-four was the year of Dien Bien Phu, where
Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietminh battalions climaxed the shattering
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of a French strategic plan approved by American staff officers.*
It was the year of the crisis to which our government brought
the world when it planned intervention in an effort to retrieve
the disaster, the year that John Foster Dulles (Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz tell us) twice proposed to Bidault
the dropping of nuclear bombs on Vietnam and south China. 4
It was the year of Geneva, the settlement made possible by
British (and in the end, French) insistence, by Ho Chi Minh's
compromises, and by pessimistic staff studies by our army. 5
And it was still the year 1954 when Washington began
to tear up that agreement. That decision has shaped everything
which has happened since in what was once French Indo-China:
the efforts of our diplomats and CIA agents to bring down the
neutralist Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; the seesaw in Laos
where the American-directed overthrow of three neutralist
governments led in the end to those stern events that compelled
a reluctant Kennedy administration to accept a somewhat
toughened rewrite of Geneva; and, the central event, the war in
Vietnam.
In October 1954, three months after our government had
pledged not to upset by force the Geneva settlement, President
Eisenhower promised support to Ngo Dinh Diem personally, in
effect naming him the Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek of
the Republic of Vietnam. That declaration led to war by severa]
inevitable stages. There followed the moves that sent Bao Dai
back to the night clubs and gave Diem** undisputed power; the
refusal of the new U.S.-Diem alliance to hold the North-South
elections provided for at Geneva, elections which Ho Chi Minh
and the Vietminh certainly would have won; the swift construction of an anti-Communist absolutism south of the 17th
parallel which dis a vowed the neutralism envisaged at Geneva
and which was immediately armed by the United States in
viola tion of Geneva.

* The resistance in Indo-China was called the Vietminh, an abbreviation of the Vietnamese for "League for the Independence of Vietnam."
** Like the Chinese, the Vietnamese put the family name first, but
unlike the Chinese customarily refer to a person by the second part of his
given name. Prominent persons are called by their family names, and in
1955 Ngo Dinh Diem asked to be referred to as Ngo. No doubt to
distinguish him from his brothers, he is nevertheless usually called Diem.
Ho Chi Minh is Ho, but Vo Nguyen Giap is Giap.
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Violation of the "no reprisals" clause in the Geneva treaty
followed logically. The countryside had accepted the new regime
quietly for the most part. It wanted nothing so much as peace,
and in any case was left defenseless by the transfer north, in
accordance with Geneva, of regular Vietminh formations and
others totaling 100,000 and the dispersal to their homes of the
local partisan forces. During those first years Diem was able to
collect taxes in three-quarters of the villages. 6
Yet there remained the other quarter of the villages, many
of them in the most secure of the Vietminh's mountain and
jungle bases, the Vietminh presence in general, and the skeleton
organizations that it certainly left behind. To cOI18Olidate his
position, Diem acted in both town and country. Beginning in
1954 the North-South peace committees set up in Saigon, Hue,
Dalat and elsewhere were arrested. Manhunts for Vietminh
cadres and members of the hamlet committees were launched
by police and army units in key rural districts in the N am-bo
(old Cochin China) and in the coastal provinces around Hue.
Scores became corpses in the b~mboo hedges; thousands were
arrested. During the Vietnamese New Year's of 1955 a group
of Vietminh adherents were clubbed and strangled and their
bodies thrown over Vinh Trinh dam. 7 Such events were the
seeds of civil war.
The resettlement policy that later developed into the
agrovilles and strategic hamlets also began early. About 860,000
northerners, two-thirds of them Catholic, fled south from the
Communists in 1954-1955. 8 Thousands of these families were
given land, reclaimed or taken from the French for the most
part, and placed in U.S.-financed showcase settlements in the
Mekong delta and elsewhere. Enclaves of presumably reliable
persons were thus set down in the Vietminh-infected countryside.
At the same time, whole villages in the more accessible of the
old Vietminh strongholds were uprooted arid resettled, the
inhabitants being given special identity cards.
The regime created a "National Revolutionary Movement"
which in town and country propagated anti-Communism, nationalism, a puritanical morality, Confucian traditionalism (the
birthday of Confucius was made a national holiday, and in
1958 .some 10 million piastres were spent on rebuilding Con-
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fucian temples and the like), and some doctrines called Personalism taken by Diem from French Catholic writers.
And the program included reforms, actual and projected,
and good deeds. The countryside had its model settlements, like
Cai San, and in some ordinary villages, too, there was rebuilding
of roads and bridges, some school construction, distribution of
seeds and tools, credit extension, anti-malaria drives, .a nd other
medical and hygiene work. Decrees promised the peasants even
greater benefits than had been Vietminh practice; as they were
proclaimed, the landlords who had sat out the war in Saigon
under French protection regained their controlling power in the
countryside. A land distribution program, weak to start with
(landlords were allowed to keep 260 acres plus a large plot for
"purposes of ancestor worship") and sabotaged by the landlords
from the beginning, accomplished little before the war engulfed
it. 9
All this, the good things exaggerated and the decrees taken

for fact, went into the accounts of the "Diem miracle" published
in our periodicals during these years-the accounts that in
1959 persuaded the Freedom Foundation at Valley Forge to
bestow its Freedom Leadership Award on Diem. The settlement
of Cai San, subject of illustrated brochures, was the token of
everything; police and troops had to be called out to quell a
demonstration of its inhabitants when they found that the officials who handed them their title deeds kept their hands
stretched out.
The pivotal year was 1957. Diem had secured his position
by largely destroying the armed forces of the Cao Dai and
Roa Hoa religious sects and the Bing Xugen, a gangster
fraternity. His police and army, receiving nearly two thirds
of the American dollars, were idle. At the same time political
repreSsion and economic downturn were stirring neutralist and
rival nationalist groups in the cities; in Laos another neutralist
government took over. This is how David Hotham, correspondent
for the London Times, summed up the situation:
There is in ~outh Vietnam no freedom of the press; there are
ordered verdicts in the courts, and the clauses of the liberal
constitution are a dead letter. The whole regime is a facade,
propped up by money from across the seas . . . the economic
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situation rots hourly.' The Franco-Chinese commercial system is
collapsing, and there is nothing yet to replace it. The unemployed
number hundreds of thousands. A deep lethargy hangs over the
people. With all the influx of aid-American, Colombo Plan,
United Nations, and a multitude of charitable organizationsnothing is done for the people, nothing to create new industries. 10

Diem directed his attention-not the attention of reforms
but of police and troops-to the countryside. Concentrating
first on nine provinces in the Nam-bo east of Saigon, taking one
district at a time, the army, police, and militant youths went
through the villages, informers in their midst, petty officials not
far behind. The village administrations were toughened, the
people assembled and lectured on the demon of Communism,
lurking everywhere. Vietminh veterans and family members and
suspects by the thousands were sent to the prisons and political
re-education camps. Ngo Dinh Can, one of the brothers, himself directed a simultaneous operation out of Hue in the north,
and, according to Philippe Devillers' account in the China
Quarterly, "had recourse to the toughest of methods."ll
Hotham this pictures the countryside during the 1956-1957
period:
Since the defeat of the sects in 1955 Diem's army and police
have been notorious for their activities in the villages-widespread
arrest and imprisonment without evidence and without trial of
persons suspected of being Communists or "enemies of the state."
According to reliable sources, about 14,000 persons were arrested
in central Annam alone at the time of the March 1956 elections.
Since then the process has, according to all reports, increased
rather than diminished. Far from giving security, there is every
reason to suppose that the army, buttressed by the Civil Guard
(a sort of rural police of 50,000 men) is regarded by the Southern
peasant as a symbol of insecurity and repression. 12

Thus came about the confrontation in the countryside
where a war for independence that was also the beginning
of a revolution had been fought for eight years.

To violate a treaty is easy; to undo the realities that it
expressed is something else. Vietnam was not a blank page
when our government decided it had to have an anti-Communist
absolutism in Saigon.
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It is 70 years since Jean-Louis de Lanessan deplored "the
burning of villages, the mass shootings, the bayonet slaughters,
and the execution of notables" that characterized the French
prosecution of the 12-year war they had to fight to make good
their annexation of Tongking and Annam in 1883. Under
Pham Dinh Phung and De Tham the Vietnamese fought a
progenitor of the partisan-political war; resistance continued
sporadically until the capture of De Tham in 1913, and the
grandfathers still remember him.
The Vietminh was strongest in northern Tongking "a nd
the Red River delta, but its power existed to the Camau cape.
Its bases in the Nam-bo were never broken by the French.
There and in the coastal provinces in the center the gold-starred
red flag of the republic flew over areas inhabited by two million
people-areas which hardly saw a Frenchman during the entire
war. Some five million others lived in the partisan areas which
were contested and which the Vietminh controlled at night;
millions of others lived in villages that knew the Vietminh
presence and sent their sons to it.
The opening of a hundred doors out of the old feudalcolonial society, the distribution to the peasants of some million
acres of land, a 25 percent reduction in rents, the chasing of
money lenders, the setting up of hamlet committees, the beginnings of education and health care-these were what generated
the great common effort that enabled the Vietnamese countryside to form and support battalions on the move, that gave the
Vietminh the power to fight the French utterly alone until
1950, that in 13 years transformed the Vietminh from a hopeful
conference of Communists and nationalists in south China into
the victors of Dien Bien Phu.
Was there in 1957 any serious appraisal of such changes
by the diplomats, officer observers, technicians, and CIA agents
assigned to the Vietnam effort by Washington? If Devillers is
correct, some of the Americans in fact prodded the Diem regime
in 1957 to crack down in the villages:
There are serious reasons for supposing that it was encouraged
along this path by certain American activists milieux who were
alarmed by the agreement over Laos . . . and by the continued
existence in the rural areas in the South of certain cells and centres
of Communist influence. The de facto integration of South Vietnam
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within the American military defense structure implied that the
region ought to be secure, and, hence, purged of anything which
might, however remotely, serve the Red cause. 13

The years 1957-1959 saw the translation of such formulations into rural torments; they also saw the counterpoint of the
resistance. Devillers, Catholic and anti-Communist, who in his
Histoire de Vietnam (1952) admired his co-religionist Ngo
Dinh Diem as "known for his perfect integrity, his competence
and his intelligence," a decade later describes in the China
Quarterly the fury of the counter-revolution:
A certain sequence of events became almost classical: denunciation, encirclement of villages, searches and raids, arrests of
suspects, plundering, interrogations enlivened by torture (even
of innocent people), deportation and "regrouping of populations"
suspected of intelligence with the rebels, etc. 14

As these events were taking place, even serious American
publications continued to describe the "Diem miracle." Ngo
Dinh Diem "believes in democracy" but is "compelled to
ration it," Wolf Ladejinsky, an agrarian expert in Diem's employ for a period, wrote in The Reporter of December 24th,
1959. "The overwhelming majority of the people in South
Vietnam are not affected by the regime's authoritarianism. They
have probably never enjoyed greater freedom."
V ntiI 195? the interlocked Vietminh-Communist organizations in the South, as well as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, had acted cautiously, for the same reasons that
had led the Vietminh to accept the division of the nation in the
first place: in brief, the lesson of Korea and the dictates of a
policy that, from 1945 on, worked through a coalition internally
and for broad international ties, in the interests of the nation
and its revolution, externally. In 1955-1956 Ho Chi Minh tried
to cajole the French into enforcing the Geneva agreement, and
in the end did no more than protest the V.S.-Diem refusal to
hold the July 1956 elections.
In the South the Vietminh concentrated on getting the
story of the early manhunts to the world through the International Control Commission, scores of its adherents sacrificing
themselves to this cause. Observed David Hotham in 1957:
"During the three years since [Diem] came to power there has
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been neither aggression from the north, nor any determined
effort by the Communists to subvert the Southern regime from
within."15
The 'resistance began that year (even as Saigon officially
declared the Vietminh "extinct") as a spy hunt and gradually
grew into armed formations. The informers were killed off,
and with them large numbers of the new village chiefs, police,
members of the Denunciation of Communism Committees,
security officials, and youth zealots. By mid-1958 Diem's network
of informers had been gravely weakened. Aroused by the drying
up of their sources of information, Devillers writes, the police
and the army "resorted to worse barbarity" and "in that fateful
year of 1958 overstepped all bounds." The peasants "lent their
assistance to the Communists. "16
The regime's instruments of repression reached out in 1958
to liberals and rival nationalists, to associates of associates and
relatives. In March, a leading opposition nationalist newspaper
in Saigon, T hoi Luan was suppressed; in August, a purge of the
civil administration and military began. "A revolt is simmering,"
a nationalist group had declared in March.17 It boiled nine
months later. One of the catalytic events was the news from
Phu Loi political re-education camp near Saigon. That December
a number of the inmates died of food poisoning in one night.
When the prisoners rioted, troops fired on them. 18 The winter
of 1958-1959 saw the springIng up in many districts of small
groups of armed rebels.
The arms were few at first, and the rebels assorted-many
Communists and Vietminh veterans, and also Caodai -ists, nationalists, semi-bandits and persons in the category Edgar Snow
describes as "not (yet) Communist. "19 The groups were linked,
the Communist-Vietminh elements took the central leadership;
the old Vietminh bases were reactivated. And the agrarian
revolution was taken up where it had been dropped. This is
how Max Clos described it in Le Figaro:
J

In the first place" there is the matter of land reform. The
regime did carry one out several years ago, but it was infinitely
more modest than the Vietminh's. The result is that landowners
who were refugees in Saigon during the war reoccupied their
farms in 1956-57 ,a nd demanded rent payment. The peasants did
not like it . . .
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The Vietminh knew how to take advantage of these circum·
stances. . . . They assumed the role of defenders of the people,
dispensers of justice, righters of wrongs; the loyal Vietminh partyworker became a kind of Robin Hood. All those with whom I
spoke told me: "The population often joyously acclaimed the
assassination of an over-zealous police official or of a dishonest
public servant."20

During the three years 1959-1961 the rebellion spread. The
Diem regime, isolated politically and driven back by and large
to the urban bases and strong points from which the French
had fought the Vietminh, undertook building the fortified
agrovilles in key areas and conducted sweep after sweep, using
American planes and artillery, in the Mekong delta, on the
coastal plain, and elsewhere. The classic cause-and-effect was
put this way to Max Clos in 1961 by a troubled paratroop
commander:
First of all, we have had no reliable information for at
least six months. When we go on a mission, we find deserted
villages . . . . Put yourself in the position of an officer who has
suffered losses. It is evident that the population knows what is
happening. He has the villagers brought to him. They refuse to
talk. Sometimes, they are molested or worse. After this, those who
were not Viet tend to join them. 21

Organized rebel formations exceeded 10,000 in 1960 and
20,000 by the end of 1961; armed auxiliaries in the villages
expanded to four or five times that number. Lives were traded
for guns; arsenals were set up which made weapons out of auto
springs and such things. Operations became more political;
as much energy was spent in organizing village meetings as in
staging ambushes.
Thousands of acres were distributed; the landlords fled to
Saigon and the provincial centers. A landlord told Clos that
early in 1960 "imperceptibly things changed. The peasants became hostile." He fled to Bac-Lieu (now a major American
- base) where his tenants informed him by letters that "the land
belongs to them under a decision of the Vietminh authorities
concerning land reform." Some letters demanded reimbursement of the rent "unfairly levied" previously.22
What may prove to be the decisive event of the war was
the formation of the National Liberation Front in December
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1960. Into it went not only the rural and city underground
political, peasant, trade union, and youth groups which had
been revived under Communist-Vietminh leadership, but also
elements of the neutralist, nationalist, and religious sect opposition to Diem.
Shut out in the travesties of elections, their newspapers
suppressed for verbal "sabotage of public order" or raided by
Diem's youth zealots, their leaders in jail, exile or hiding; the
middle-class opponents of the regime found themselves facing
oblivion. Petitions for liberalization of government policies in
April and August, 1960, brought nothing but accusations that
the authors were tools of the Reds. In November came the
attempted nationalist coup in Saigon that failed on the threshold
of success because of the irresolution of the plotters. ("All witnesses agree that at the time of the abortive coup . . . the
population had joyously greeted the news of the regime's fall,"
says Clos.) 23 The alternative, the National Liberation Front,
realized the next month, became the only practical answer to
some, distastefully as they regarded Communism and North
Vietnam. 24
That winter the posters and handbills of the Front appeared
all over South Vietnam; and every newspaper, anny unit,
government department, and foreign mission received its program. Worked out in covert discussions, it called for a coalition
government, democratic pr"actices, neutralism in foreign policy,
agrarian reform, protection of industry against the import glut,
a new deal for minorities, and step-by-step reunification with
the North by negotiation.
The first congress of the Front held February 16-March
3, 1962, "somewhere in South Vietnam" drew 20 political,
religious, and ethnic organizations. Elected to its 31-member
central committee, in addition to delegates from the People'S
Revolutionary Party newly organized by the 'Communists, were
the secretary-general of the Democratic Party, a Buddhist bonze,
Caodai priests, a Protestant leader from the tribespeople living
on the high plateau, and various non-party intellectuals fled
from Saigon. Nguyen Van Hieu, head of the dispersed South
Vietnam Peace Committee and of the small Radical Socialist
Party, became general secretary. Nguyen Huu Tho, a lawyer
16

who escaped from one of Diem's prisons in 1961, was named
chairman.
But those who went into the mountains were less important
than those who stayed where they were and kept secret their
sympathies, firm or half-way, with the Front. Through the
Front the rebels in the countryside acquired a broadened underground ally in the cities and towns which reached into the
army and administration. Who and how many are its friends,
what its relations are with outside nationalist and other groups,
remain the unknowns which may be the key to the future.
By the end of 1961 the formations carrying the red-andblue flag of the National Liberation Front controlled perhaps
80 percent of the countryside, at least in the mercy of the dark.
Local and regional governments had been set up which collected
taxes and food supplies, ran small workshops and schools, pushed
the agrarian reform and prosecuted the war.25
Strongest north and west of Saigon, where they claimed
to have liberated 1,100 of the 1,290 villages, and in the central
highlands, where they reported varying degrees of control of
some 4,000 of the 4,400 hamlets, the rebels also were penetrating
into areas where the Vietminh had been relatively weak. 26
Bentre, 45 miles north of Saigon and fairly quiet during
the French war, was "the most 'rotten' province in South
Vietnam," Max Clos found. There, he reported, the Catholic
villages had driven away the priests, accusing them of "denouncing to the authorities the peasants who did not think right."27
And there in June 1962 two Americans were killed in an
ambush. Scores of peasants watched the partisans set up the
ambush and not a single one went down the road to inform
the garrison. "Could this have happened if peasants felt any
real identification with the regime?" asked Homer Bigart in the
New York Times (July 25, 1962).
Such was the situation in which the Kennedy administration
intervened with new force in 1961 and 1962. In Laos at this
time the United States was also confronted with the evaporation
of the militant anti-Communist power it had sought to create,
and there, shying away from war in that interior jungle alley,
it finally agreed to a settlement. In Vietnam the opposite
decision was taken. Step by step, each reported belatedly to the
American people and each softened with disclaimers, the ad-
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ministration made the Vietnam war "our war." In 1961 the
intervention was weapons; in 1962, weapons and men-the
"advisers." In November 1961 the number of Americans in
South Vietnam was placed at 865; by the winter of 1962-1963
it was said to be 12,000.
Weapons, killings, destruction-that has become the American answer, as it was the Japanese answer, to the painfully
built power of peasants with shabby rifles and stomachs full of
amoebas. Napalm is "a sensitive subject here," Bigart noted in
the New York Times, and few of the killed villages have received
an obituary notice. Chemical poisons that destroy crops and
sicken people, rocket-firing planes, helicopters, flame throwers,
amphibious craft, micro jet rockets, police dogs (used in north
China too )-weapons old and new, some experimental, were
dumped in vast quantities on the docks of Saigon and taken
into battle by graduates of new counter-insurgency courses who
could quote Mao Tse-tung.28
The element of reform that had injected a note of hope
during the first years of the American effort in South Vietnam
was pushed to the -background. W. w. Rostow, chairman of
the State Department's Policy Planning Council, dismissed as a
"half-truth" Mao's dictum on the correlation between guerrilla
war and popular support, and a briefing officer in Washington
defined the "civic action" needed in South Vietnam as "such
things as solving a local rice shortage, training police forces,
providing public information programs in the villages," adding:
Guerrilla experts feel some people in Washington . . . overemphasize the value of social reform.
They say the Vietnamese are not basically discontented with
their government.
Most villagers aren't politically conscious. They are interested
only in the problems of their viIIages and don't want or need-at
this point-massive economic development, land reform or modernization programs. 29

Bernard B. Fall of Howard University, a specialist in
Southeast Asia, summed up the new approach-close enough to
"kill all, burn all"-in a year-end report: Experience has shown
that popular support is a major factor in revolutionary wars
but "this does not exclude the possibility of the discovery of
radically new methods of counter-insurgency in which popular
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support can be replaced by technical or tactical innovations."3o
"The progress of the war in South Vietnam suggests to
some observers that the Mao handbook ... needs to be revised
in the light of recent military technology," Robert Trumbull
wrote in the New York Times (April 14, 1963). "Mr. Mao's
principles may remain the same, but napalm and helicopters
have added a new Clausewitz."
This is what the war in Vietnam is like:
Deserted V iIlages-ln some areas the signs of disaffection are
clear enough. Observers of sweeps by the Vietnamese army through
the Mekong delta provinces are often struck by the phenomenon
of deserted villages. As troops approach, all flee, except for a few
old men and children. No one offers information; no one hurries
to put out flags. 3 !
Strategic Hamlet-The Government was able to persuade
only 70 families to volunteer for resettlement. The 135 other
families in the half dozen settlements were herded forcibly from
their homes . . .
Some families had been allowed to carry away beds, tables
and benches before their homes were butned. Others had almost
nothing but the clothes on their backs. A young woman stood
expressionless as she recounted how the troops had burned the
families' two tons of rice . . .
Observers said it certainly was better than former operations
wherein families were roughly ordered out of their homes, often
with no time to gather these possessions, and marched off to a
stockade with no provisions for food or w.ater.32
Victory-They trapped the rebels in a patch of dense undergrowth and forced them into a tight, 300-yard circle. The Rangers
moved into ·the area in groups of five, each with sub-machine guns,
and a flame thrower for each five-man team. They tightened the
circle slowly. . ..
When they had the rebels in a l00-yard circle, the Rangers
began cutting a firebreak around the circle. . . . Running around
the outer perimeter of the circle with flame throwers, they set the
circle of jungle on fire and sat back to listen to the screams of
trapped guerrillas and the popping of the stolen ammunition.
Jungle wood is resinous. . . .
We never found how many rebel Vietcong were caught in
that inferno. We couldn't find the bodies.
The Rangers held a party that night . . . .83
Prisoners-I have orders to take one prisoner if possible. It's
possible, so I pick out the scrawniest in the lineup and tie his hands
securely....
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The Rangers coax the other nine prisoners with gun butts and
nailed boots, shoving them toward the jungle on the other side of
the clearing. Officially, I hear nothing and see nothing. All I know
is that I've heard a couple of bursts of sub-machine-gun fire, and
my Rangers come back to the village compound. A few are
spattered with fresh blood. . . . The Vietnamese shrug and I
shrug back. 3 •

Interrogation-The day we arrived Time~s Charlie Mohr was
out on a mission with several hundred Vietnamese Rangers, and
two American instructors, in a helicopter-borne dawn surprise
attack on a Vietcong stronghold only ten miles from Saigon, in
terrain patched with paddies and woods. He told us at dinner
how a half dozen uniformed guerrillas had been killed and as
many captured. Two of the latter, aged 15 and 19, were tortured
for two hours. Neither broke....85

Nineteen sixty-two was the year of the strategic hamlet and
the helicopter. The rebels were weakened in some areas, checked
in others; they suffered substantial losses, even allowing for the
exaggerations of a casualty accounting system in which every
corpse is a Vietcong. Several thousand hamlets were transformed by forced labor on a vast scale into fort-prisons of varying
elaborateness, and large numbers of other hamlets were destroyed
to create free kill zones in the perimeter areas, as the U.S.-Diem
forces moved toward their objective of making strategic hamlets
of two-thirds of the 16,000-17,000 in South Vietnam. The
helicopters enabled the Americans and the Vietnamese units
under them to strike hard and fast at points within what the
rebels had considered their secure rear; in the beginning the
guerrillas fled at the approach of these great birds with bellies
full of killers.
Yet these elaborations of the tactics used by the Japanese
in China failed to alter decisively the military balance of power.
The great area of mountain, marsh, and jungle allowed rebel
units under pressure to use the tactic of the dispersal, the essential
guerrilla defense. Despite losses, the regular rebel formations
expanded by several thousands. The limitations of American
tactics became discernible, and to its points the rebels worked
out counterpoints. Observed one of our advisers to David Halberstarn of the New York Times (October 11, 1962): "These boys
never quit in their seH-appraisal and self-criticism. That aspect
of them is pretty impressive."

20

Fortified or not, the hamlets have to be policed within and
defended from attacks from without. Diem's army and militia
-essentially a non-army, like General Phoumi Novasan's in
Laos and like the Chinese forces organized by the Japaneseremain too few, though tremendously expanded, to defend all
of the hamlets all of the time and too defensive-minded to be
effective in touch-and-go situations. In August the rebels reported
the destruction of 256 hamlets in five provinces and the taking
over from the inside of large numbers of others. Some fortified
hamlets are known to have changed hands several times.
The shooting down of helicopters in the winter of 19621963 showed that the rebels were learning how to deal with
them; and the slower, lightly armed H-21 transport helicopters
were given more protection and used more circumspectly. As
in China, the arms of the enemy tended to become the arms
of the rebels. An Associated Press correspondent reported from
Saigon after the rebel victory at Cep Bac:
South Vietnam's Communist guerrillas have built their arsenal
of modern weapons to impressive proportions, and American
helicopters are feeling the bite.
Only ·.a few months ago the average Vietcong guerrilla had to
rely on his homemade shotgun or old French rifle to blast away at
the big American machines wheeling down on him with loads of
troops.
Now, thanks to captured American weapons, the guerrilla
has a good chance of making trouble for the helicopters.
Anns used by the Communists include M-l Garand rifles,
3D-caliber machine guns, and some 50-caliber machine guns. . . .
Some Vietcong units are equipped with 57-MM recoilless cannon .
. . . Arms supplied to the Vietcong from outside the country h~ve
been negligible. . . .
The Communists-many of whom started out as simple
farmers-have gained experience with the helicopters. They have
discovered how to lead their targets in flight. They know the
vital parts to aim at. Even the relatively faster fighter planes are
taking an increasing number of hits.86

In an accounting at the beginning of 1963, Robert Scigliano, a member of the former Michigan State University
mission to Diem, noted the gains made against the rebels but
concluded that they were better trained, better armed, and
better led, as well as 5,000 more numerous, at the end of 1962
than at the beginning of the year. 37
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And in the decisive political sector of this war without
fronts the year 1962 saw a further decline for the U.S.-Diem
alliance. In February came the napalm bombing of Diem's
palace by two of his Air Force pilots, part of a plot which
involved some army units. In July came the Laos settlement,
which the Diem government had done what it could to prevent.
The National Liberation Front moved immediately to
exploit the Laos treaty, calling for the extension of its principles
to South Vietnam. Taking over ideas put forward by Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia, it proposed the establishment of a
neutral belt made up of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.
It stressed its call for a coalition government and played down
the question of national reunification, looking to a gradual
solution on the basis of negotiations.
As Laos brought a wind of hope to some of Diem's many
kinds of enemies, the position of the United States hardened.
The briefing given to arriving diplomats boiled down to "Don't
rock the boat," and the slogan "Sink or swim with Diem" was
coined. U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting's idea of a constructive political step was to lecture publicly the non-Communist opposition to Diem for its failure to rally around the
regime which had decimated it.
Dr. Stanley Millet of Briarcliff College, the political scientist
who was accused by the Saigon police of involvement in the
palace bombing, gives this picture of sentiment in anti-Communist intellectual and privileged-class circles:
The city Vietnamese felt themselves trapped. "Do you understand how it is with us?" they would begin. And then the tales
would unfold of terror, arrests, oppression, and bungling . . .
In that entire year I never heard a single Vietnamese voice
raised in defense of the Diem regime. as

Concluded Scigliano: "The Vietnamese leadership seemed
to be more than ever isolated from its people, and public morale,
at least in the cities, was at a low. Thus, while the military
situation in Vietnam improved somewhat during the year, the
political situation worsened."39
"We don't see the end of the tunnel," said President
Kennedy in one of the most cautious of the expressions of
cautiou~ optimism that emanate periodically from the administration."'o
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Dean Acheson was less impressed with the revolutionary
war fought against the Japanese and later against the Kuomintang than with the fact that some Chinese Communists had
been to Moscow. "The Communists took over in China at a
ridiculously small cost," he told the Advertising Council at the
White House in Fe:hruary 1950. "What they did was to invite
some Chinese leaders who were dissatisfied with the way things
were going in their country to Moscow." These leaders were
"indoctrinated" and "returned to China" and were "completely
subservient to the Moscow regime. "41
As the French position in Indo-China deteriorated, Acheson
and John Foster Dulles were less impressed with the Vietminh's
years of struggle and painfully acquired power than with the
role of Peking. In 1954 Dulles attributed France's troubles to
"professionally trained agitators" who were "largely equipped
and trained in China. "42
Now the victors of Dien Bien Phu are at last recognized to
have revolutionary capabilities of their own, but again over the
border. The Kennedy administration points an accusatory finger
at Hanoi. The over-the-border and agitator theory of revolution
has notably failed to explain and forecast the trend of events in
Asia since 1945. A reversal of what is primary and what is
secondary in revolutions, it has however survived and is at the
root of American miscalculations in South Vietnam.
Yet there is this element of truth in it: Vietnam is one
nation, and the several roles played by North Vietnam in the
war will shape the unfolding of events.
Ho Chi Minh's cautious policy of accepting both the
Geneva agreement and the U.S.-Diem violations of it in 19541956 has been continued with modifications, despite pressures
for more drastic action and some internal disagreement. The
doctrine proclaimed by the Lao Dong (Communist party) is
that the South must win its own war, and in fact North Vietnam's counter-intervention has been limited. Cadres, most of
them Southerners transferred north in 1954, some money, radio
equipment, drugs and the like, a thin flow of arms-this is the
extent of Hanoi's contribution to what is essentially South
Vietnamese rebel power created by South Vietnamese hands.·'
Set up against the American contribution to Diem of nearly
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$1.5 million a day it would perhaps be in the ratio of a fraction
of a cent to the dollar. Yet the minimum objective of North
Vietnam's help is to enable the rebels to stay in the field, and it
has to be assumed that the flow will increase if necessary.
This is the broader point-counterpoint of the Vietnam war.
Steadily enlarging its commitment in defense of Diem, our
government is playing the chess game of escalation under
conditions which give Hanoi the many advantages of proximity
and being Vietnamese. Our strategists have acknowledged the
temptation to strike out against what the briefing officers again
call the "privileged sanctuaries" north of the 17th parallel;
:Admiral Harry D. Felt and other admirals and generals are
on record as favoring such action "if necessary." The protraction
of the war-and protraction is the prospect of the momentwould increase the temptation; provocative or escalating actions
by local commanders or CIA groups are a possibility suggested
by the history of the Korean War and of post-Geneva Laos.
It seems probable that, in its efforts to get out of Kennedy's
dark tunnel, Washington will sooner or later be drawn to the ,
ultimate ' choice it faced in Vietnam in 1954: to call a halt
at last and accept another setback in Asia or to enlarge the war.
North Vietnam also intervenes, and will increasingly intervene, in the affairs of South Vietnam, simply by existing. Under
the tight control of the Lao Dong, austere and beset with food
and other scarcities, it is a society successfully making the steep
ascent out of feudal-colonialism. 44 And though it has hurt many
of its people in the past nine years--pushing to extremes the
"denunciation of misery" campaign of the early years, putting
heavy pressure on the peasantry both to produce and to accept
quickly collective methods, giving its writers and artists an
overdose of "social realism"-it has the strength of being a
'great common effort. It has always been Hanoi which has
called for an opening of the gates shutting off the North from
the South, and Saigon which has refused. The teams of U .S.Diem agents sent north since 1956 to apply the over-the-border
notion of revolution have achieved nothing except plain acts of
sabotage!5 A French reporter, Jules Roy, recently published
these first-hand impressions in L'Express:
... it is only simple justice to recognize that, from the chief of
state to the poorest Meo mountain tribesman, no one is begging

24

for anything and everyone is sharing courageously in the nation's
struggle for existence. Not a single functionary is open to bribery.
Not a single officer is robbing the state, an occupation so common
in all the other countries of Southeast Asia. The sick do not have
to pay for hospital care ...
Poverty in North Vietnam is not the special province of the
poor: it is the destiny of all. For this reason it has a dignity that
forces the foreigner also to embrace it, sharing what he has. . . . It
is a matter of managing without the resources of the South for as
long as necessary, of increasing industrial and agricultural production at any cost.46

By trial and error, North Vietnam has created a still
evolving system of producer cooperatives and state farms in the
Red Ri ver delta to replace the extreme parcelization of plots
that characterized the feudalism perpetuated there by the French.
An area that once imported nails from France, it makes and
exports machine tools. With a swiftly expanding base of heavy
industry, it is an island of industrialism-on-the-way in a Southeast
Asia of which Bernard B. Fall recently had this to say:
For almost six years, from 1954 until 1960, the Communists
gave the West a bre<!thing space in the area. Only now does it
become clearly apparent how badly that time has been used, or
rather misused. In spite of lavish expenditures none of the countries
concerned achieved the Rostowian "takeoff" stage. In fact, it is
doubtful whether they achieved pre-1939 living standards on a
general countrywide basis. 41

North Vietnam has an industrial work force of 300,000;
in 1962 it reported a 23.2% increase in industrial output. South
Vietnam has an army of unemployed and factory jobs for
50,000-70,000 people. There the import glut of American and
Japanese manufactures has strangled industrial development,
hurting even those industries such as textiles (which have a 45year history in Saigon), cement, construction, crafts, and breweries regarded as practical for the area by American development
experts. "How is it imagined that the standard of living of a
whole Asian people can be raised appreciably in a short time
without the creation of a single new industry?" asked David
Hotham in 1957 before the start of the war. 48 The rise of
modem factories in the slum belt that surrounded French Hanoi
is noted respectfully in otherwise unfriendly Vietnamest writings;
northern economic statistics are a political weapon in the South.
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To outrage the revolution begun in South Vietnamese
villages by the Vietminh, to affront also the varied forces of
neutralism that have proved stubborn in Cambodia and Laosthis is truly pulling the beard of the tiger. If the forces of the
National Liberation Front were as isolated as the Huks in the
Philippines and the Chinese that fought the British in Malaya
for a decade, it is barely possible that the United States could
tum the countryside of South Vietnam into a combination of
stockade and solitude and call it peace. But the war is being
waged on the border of established Communist power. It is
not too much to say that the Vietnam war is a repeat course
for an Establishment that is a particularly slow learner about
the situation in Asia.
As in Laos in the summer of 1962, our government could
obtain peace in Vietnam by agreeing to the Geneva settlement
or a variation of it. Nothing could be clearer than Kennedy's
disinterest in any such terms. He rebuffed with a cool phrase
Khrushchev's suggestion that the Laotian principle be extended
elsewhere; briefing officers have dismissed with a sentence or
two the peace proclamations of the National Liberation Front.
It is likely that any coalition government set up in Saigon
would sooner or later wind up a Communist government. Too
much has happened since the summer of 1945, when Communist Party members in Indo-China numbered perhaps 5,000.
Yet at stake for Washington is more even than the "real estate"
of South Vietnam and the prestige it has invested in the Diem
government. At stake too is the consequence of that vast partisanpolitical war in China: the Chinese Revolution and the continuing American policy of seeking to demonstrate that it is a
passing phase.
Everything that has happened in Southeast Asia since Dien
Bien Phu reflects Washington's determination to try to bring
about the downfall of the Peking regime. With such a hope
and goal it cannot tolerate even neutralism in the Indo-China
states. To accept its failure to destroy neutralism in Laos was
awkward enough. The Laos settlement put its failure in writing
and obliged it to extend de jure recognition to Peking for the
first time. The anti-Communist absolutists around the rim of
Asia had reason to be dismayed. Any follow-up to Laos in
South Vietnam would be certain to have repercussions in Seoul,
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Taiwan, Bangkok, and elsewhere; searches for new ways out
based on the premise that Chinese Communism is here to stay
would begin. It may be that the basic American policy of promoting counter-revolution in China is being put to its final
test in Vietnam.
Yet such a perspective should not conclude but be the
beginning of appraisal. If Communism should reach Saigon,
what kind? What would be the character of a viable, united
Vietnam in the light of Ho Chi Minh's record and the history
of the Vietminh? What useful and profitable relationships could
the United States reasonably hope to establish with the various
revolutionary and neutralist regimes that would develop in an
Asia left to go its own way? What changes could be expected in
China itself in the situation-the unique situation-of being
free of American "total diplomacy?" Our libertarian traditions
and practices-the aspect of our society most worth conserving
and strengthening-are not among the American exports to
the anti-Communist outposts in Asia. Could they fare any worse,
and might they not find a good deal more nourishment, in an
Asia at last broken out of the prison of economic backwardness?
Such are the questions that ought to be studied by the
true centrists close to the sources of American power-those
who recognize that the deepest movements of history can be
steered but not halted, and that every governing order today
has the responsibility of effecting transitions that leave the
world alive.
Resolute as the Kennedy administration is to continue the
Vietnam war, some misgivings are apparent in responsible
circles. Some of our leading newspapers have asked sharp questions in editorials; some of our best reporters have come close
to spelling the situation out for us.
The recent study of U.S. aid to Southeast Asia by a Senate
subcommittee and Senator Mike Mansfield's accompanying
letter of transmittal phrase their conclusions with caution and
restraint but suggest a belief that a change of policy is in order.
Recalling his visit to Saigon of seven years ago (when he was
hailed as the "godfather of the Republic of Vietnam"), Mansfield declares that "What is most disturbing is that Vietnam
now appears to be, as it was then, only at the beginning of
coping with its grave inner problems. All of the current dif-
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ficulties existed in 1955, along with the hope and energy to
meet them. But it is seven years and $2 billions of United States
aid later . Yet, substantially the same difficulties remain if, indeed, they have not been compounded."49
The study itself suggests that escalation of the war would
not serve any American purpose. "There is no interest of the
United States in Vietnam which would justify, in present circumstances, the conversion of the war in that country primarily
into an American war to be fought with American lives."5o
To encourage such examinations and to give a rational
direction to such misgivings with the objective of ending the
war that is here and now-this is the task of concerned Americans. It is both a practical task and a moral responsibility.
Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat
it, as Santayana observed, but it has to be added that they are
able to take others along on this cruel and unnecessary journey.
A small group of Japanese opposed the New Order in
every way they could, despite penalties and pressures ranging
from imprisonment to Think of Your Family. Yet most Japanese
were detached and untroubled by the events in China. During
those first years after the incident at Marco Polo bridge the
rhythm of life in Japan hardly changed. The newspapers and
periodicals had their hopeful version of the continuing war,
along with photos: the throngs of Chinese waving their paper
flags to welcome the dawn of Co-Prosperity, Japanese soldiers
squatting in a peasant hut and drinking tea with its inhabitants,
a company with its favorite waif, troops repairing a dyke. The
natural conviction persisted that their young men would do no
more than was absolutely necessary, and for such rumored
matters as could not be easily accepted there was, for the
Japanese too, the imperative of anti-Communism, absolution for
everything. Then suddenly it was evening, and when the
accounts came in from the countryside of China and all was
told, some of the Japanese at least did not find it easy to ask
for pardon.
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